Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes

Georg Kirchsteiger, Maurizio Zanardi, Paola Conconi, David DeRemer and Lorenzo Trimarchi

No 10582, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper shows that electoral incentives affect the occurrence of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2012 period, we show that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election date. Moreover, disputes filed by the U.S. tend to target industries that are important to swing states in the presidential election. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which an incumbent can file a trade dispute to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity. The incumbent?s ability to initiate a dispute during the re-election campaign provides an advantage over the challenger, who cannot commit to file the dispute if elected. If voters? ideological preferences are not too strong in favor of either candidate, the incumbent will file a trade dispute to increase his re-election chances.

Keywords: Elections; Reciprocity; Trade disputes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D72 D78 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Suspiciously timed trade disputes (2017)
Working Paper: Suspiciously timed trade disputes (2017)
Working Paper: Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes (2015)
Working Paper: Suspiciously timed trade disputes (2015)
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