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Suspiciously timed trade disputes

Paola Conconi (), David De Remer, Georg Kirchsteiger (), Lorenzo Trimarchi () and Maurizio Zanardi ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David R. DeRemer ()

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995–2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoreticalmodel in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity.

Keywords: Trade disputes; Elections; Reciprocity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-pol
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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Published in: Journal of international economics

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Related works:
Journal Article: Suspiciously timed trade disputes (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Suspiciously timed trade disputes (2015) Downloads
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