The ‘reactive’ model of antitrust enforcement: When private interests dictate enforcement actions – The Russian case

Svetlana Avdasheva () and Polina Kryuchkova

International Review of Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 43, issue C, 200-208

Abstract: In responding to complaints, law enforcement by a supervisory authority may replicate the advantages and disadvantages of both public and private enforcement. In Russian antitrust enforcement, there are strong incentives to open investigations with respect to almost every complaint. However, increased numbers of complaints and investigations mean fewer available resources per investigation and lower standards of proof. These increased numbers also distort the enforcement structure, increase the probability of wrongful convictions and acquittals, and decrease deterrence.

Keywords: Antitrust; Russia; Public enforcement; Complaints; Legal errors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:43:y:2015:i:c:p:200-208

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.04.003

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