 Integrating agency and resource dependence theory: Firm profitability, industry regulation, and board task performanceAmedeo Pugliese (), Alessandro Minichilli and Alessandro Zattoni Journal of Business Research, 2014, vol. 67, issue 6, 1189-1200 Abstract: Boards of directors are key governance mechanisms in organizations and fulfill two main tasks: monitoring managers and firm performance, and providing advice and access to resources. In spite of a wealth of research much remains unknown about how boards attend to the two tasks. This study investigates whether organizational (firm profitability) and environmental factors (industry regulation) affect board task performance. The data combine CEOs' responses to a questionnaire, and archival data from a sample of large Italian firms. Findings show that past firm performance is negatively associated with board monitoring and advice tasks; greater industry regulation enhances perceived board task performance; board monitoring and advice tasks tend to reinforce each other, despite their theoretical and practical distinction. Keywords: Board accountability; Board task performance; Resource dependency theory board monitoring; Attention based view; Contingency view (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:67:y:2014:i:6:p:1189-1200 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2013.05.003 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Business Research is currently edited by A. G. Woodside More articles in Journal of Business Research from Elsevier |
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