Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

1980 - 2025

Current editor(s): Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

From Elsevier
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Separating economic from political influences on government decisions pp. 405-425: Lisa Crone and John Tschirhart
Privatizing the intellectual commons: Universities and the commercialization of biotechnology pp. 427-454: Nicholas S. Argyres and Julia Porter Liebeskind
Institutional framing: Some experimental evidence pp. 455-464: Catherine S. Elliott, Donald M. Hayward and Sebastian Canon
Political influence over Supreme Court criminal procedure cases pp. 465-475: Tony Caporale and Harold Winter
Stigler-Olson lobbying behavior in protectionist industries: Evidence from the lobbying power function pp. 477-499: Kishore Gawande
Paired comparison estimates of willingness to accept versus contingent valuation estimates of willingness to pay pp. 501-515: John Loomis, George Peterson, Patricia Champ, Thomas Brown and Beatrice Lucero
The voluntary contributions mechanism with uncertain group payoffs pp. 517-533: David Dickinson

A comparison of learning and replicator dynamics using experimental data pp. 263-280: Yin-Wong Cheung and Daniel Friedman
Navigating a nonlinear environment: An experimental study of decision making in a chaotic setting pp. 281-308: Diana Richards and Jude C. Hays
Strategies of search pp. 309-332: Joep Sonnemans
Oligopoly experimentation of learning with simulated markets pp. 333-355: Aurora Garcia Gallego
Skill, complexity and strategic behavior pp. 357-369: Val Lambson
Menu costs and nominal price friction: An experimental examination pp. 371-388: Bart Wilson
Some consequences of e-mail vs. face-to-face communication in experiment pp. 389-403: Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer

The organisation of capabilities pp. 139-160: Brian Loasby
Imagination and leadership - The neglected dimension of an evolutionary theory of the firm pp. 161-177: Ulrich Witt
Competence and contract in the theory of the firm pp. 179-201: Geoffrey Hodgson
Cooperative agreements and the theory of the firm: Focusing on barriers to change pp. 203-225: Frederique Sachwald
Exploiting innovation options: an empirical analysis of R& D-intensive firms pp. 229-242: Paul Y. Mang
Is firm size conducive to R&D choice? A strategic analysis of product and process innovations pp. 243-262: Xiangkang Yin and Ehud Zuscovitch

The optimal financing strategy of a high-tech firm: The role of warrants pp. 1-23: Michele Bagella and Leonardo Becchetti
Financial innovation and bank risk taking pp. 25-37: Anthony M. Santomero and Jeffrey J. Trester
High-tech firms and credit rationing pp. 39-59: Luigi Guiso
Productivity and financial sector policies: Evidence from South East Asia pp. 61-82: Panicos Demetriades, Michael Devereux and Kul Luintel
The impact of monetary regime changes: Some exchange rate evidence pp. 85-94: Tony Caporale
The coexistence of distribution systems under price search: Theory and some evidence from insurance pp. 95-115: Lisa L. Posey and Sharon Tennyson
Information concealment in the theory of vertical integration pp. 117-131: Jay Choi

An experimental solidarity game pp. 517-539: Reinhard Selten and Axel Ockenfels
Fairness preferences and optimization skills: are they substitutes?: An experimental investigation pp. 541-557: Jeremy Clark
Learning by experience and learning by imitating successful others pp. 559-575: Theo Offerman and Joep Sonnemans
Decisiveness, attitude expression and symbolic responses in contingent valuation surveys pp. 577-601: Russell K. Blamey
Gender and free riding in a threshold public goods game: Experimental evidence pp. 603-620: Charles Cadsby and Elizabeth Maynes

Regulation of the employment relationship: The 'old' institutional perspective pp. 349-385: Bruce Kaufman
Determinants of trust in supplier relations: Evidence from the automotive industry in Japan and the United States pp. 387-417: Mari Sako and Susan Helper
Structure, organizational behavior, and technical efficiency: The case of an Indian industry pp. 419-434: Murali Patibandla
Contestability reconsidered: The meaning of market exit costs pp. 435-443: Niko P. Paech
The market value of rarity pp. 445-457: Kenneth Koford and Adrian Tschoegl
Collusion in a three-tier hierarchy: Credible beliefs and pure self-interest pp. 459-475: Mark R. Frascatore
Spatial competition with intermediated matching pp. 477-488: Chris van Raalte and Harry Webers
Do managers work harder in competitive industries? pp. 489-498: Clara Graziano and Bruno M. Parigi
An hypothesis regarding pricing of black-market goods pp. 499-503: Eric Zuesse

Is altruism evolutionarily stable? pp. 193-209: Helmut Bester and Werner Guth
'A matter of trust':: Effects of communication on the efficiency and distribution of outcomes pp. 211-238: Kathleen L. Valley, Joseph Moag and Max H. Bazerman
Precedent transfer in experimental conflict-of-interest games pp. 239-249: Marc Knez
On the limits to the growth of coalitions by means of transfers pp. 251-262: Robert Rothschild
A Stackelberg model of Social Security acceptance decisions in dual career households pp. 263-278: Bridget Hiedemann
Indenturing banknotes as a mechanism to induce cooperation in conflict games pp. 279-294: Alexander Kritikos and Friedel Bolle
The design of payment systems for physicians under global budget - an experimental study pp. 295-311: Chinn-Ping Fan, Kong-Pin Chen and Kamhon Kan
The limitations of the positional order effect: Can it support silent threats and non-equilibrium behavior? pp. 313-325: Werner Guth, Steffen Huck and Amnon Rapoport
Contract design and costly verification games pp. 327-340: Chongwoo Choe

Land relations under unbearable stress: Rwanda caught in the Malthusian trap pp. 1-47: Catherine Andre and Jean-Philippe Platteau
From plan to markets pp. 49-68: Gunnar Eliasson
A theoretical model of government research and growth pp. 69-85: Walter Park
Employer sanctions on hiring illegal labor: An experimental analysis of firm compliance pp. 87-100: Jose A. Pagan
Student enrollment and faculty renewal: The response of a tenure-based university system to demographic and budgetary shocks pp. 101-127: Frank Denton, Christine Feaver and Byron G. Spencer
Constitutions and the growth of government pp. 129-142: Daniel Sutter
Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing pp. 143-161: Joep Sonnemans, Arthur Schram and Theo Offerman
On controlling crime with corrupt officials pp. 163-172: Sugata Marjit and Heling Shi
Bureaucratic behavior modeled by reduced-rank regression: The case of expenditures from the Soviet state budget pp. 173-187: John Burkett
Paternalism and the credbility problem in a centrally planned economy pp. 189-192: Ruvin Gekker