Gender differences in competition and sabotage

Simon Dato and Petra Nieken

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014, vol. 100, issue C, 64-80

Abstract: We study the differences in behavior of males and females in a two-player tournament with sabotage in a controlled lab experiment. Implementing a real-effort design and a principal who is paid based on the agent's output, we find that males and females do not differ in their performance in the real effort task but in their choice of sabotage. Males select significantly more sabotage, leading to an, on average, higher winning probability but not to higher profits. If the gender of the opponent is revealed before the tournament, males increase their performance in the real-effort task especially if the opponent is female. The gender gap in sabotage is persistent. We discuss possible explanations for our findings and their implications.

Keywords: Gender; Sabotage; Tournament; Real-effort task (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J16 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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Working Paper: Gender Differences in Competition and Sabotage (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:100:y:2014:i:c:p:64-80

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.01.012

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