Commitment problems in conflict resolution

Erik Kimbrough, Jared Rubin, Roman Sheremeta and Timothy Shields

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, vol. 112, issue C, 33-45

Abstract: Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by committing to the outcome of a conflict resolution mechanism. Commitment problems are mitigated to a greater extent for groups that opt-in to the conflict resolution mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly. Although conflict rates are higher when opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously imposed, commitment problems are greatly reduced among those groups who choose to opt-in.

Keywords: Conflict resolution; Commitment problem; Opting-in; Contests; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution (2015)
Working Paper: Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:112:y:2015:i:c:p:33-45

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.01.005

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