Self-signaling and social-signaling in giving

Zachary Grossman

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, vol. 117, issue C, 26-39

Abstract: Can a Bayesian signaling model explain patterns of giving driven by self-image concern as well as those driven by social-image? I experimentally test the predictions of such a model about how potential givers will respond to a change in the probability that their choice will be implemented. A self-signaler is predicted to respond with increased giving, but he predicted response of a social-signaler is increased giving, no change, or decreased giving depending on the information available to an outside observer. The experiment thus presents a test of the joint, independent and relative effects of social- and self-signaling in giving. The results provide little evidence of self-signaling, but stronger evidence of social-signaling.

Keywords: Giving; Self-image; Self-signaling; Social-image; Social-signaling; Dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (61)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:117:y:2015:i:c:p:26-39

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.008

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