How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form games
Daniela Glätzle-Rützler () and
Matthias Sutter ()
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2016, vol. 128, issue C, 265-285
We examine the strategic sophistication of 196 children and adolescents, aged 10–17 years, in experimental normal-form games. Besides choices, we also elicit first- and second-order beliefs. The share of subjects playing Nash or expecting opponents to play Nash is fairly stable across all age groups. The likelihood of playing best response to own beliefs increases in math skills. Using a mixture model, about 40% of subjects are classified as a strategic type, while the others are non-strategic. The distribution of types is somewhat changing with age. The estimated error rates also show some dependency on age and gender.
Keywords: Strategic thinking; Beliefs; Experiment; Age; Adolescents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:128:y:2016:i:c:p:265-285
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