Career concerns and team talent

Kieron Meagher and Suraj Prasad

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2016, vol. 129, issue C, 1-17

Abstract: We develop a model of career concerns in teams. We draw a distinction between individual talent which is associated with a member in the team and team talent which is common to all members of the team. With team talent, members have less of an incentive to free ride and effort is more efficient. With team talent, we also show that group incentive pay can yield higher profits than monitoring even when monitoring is costless.

Keywords: Career concerns; Teams; Group incentive pay; Free riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:129:y:2016:i:c:p:1-17

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.019

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