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Cooperation through communication: Teams and individuals in finitely repeated Prisoners’ dilemma games

John Kagel ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, vol. 146, issue C, 55-64

Abstract: For both two person teams and individuals unrestricted communication between opponents in a finitely repeated prisoner dilemma game results in stage-one cooperation rates of between 95–100%. Content analysis of between opponent communication focuses on the increased earnings cooperation can achieve, with minimal discussion of punishment for failing to cooperate. Restoring cooperation after an early stage-game defection typically requires compensating the aggrieved agent.

Keywords: Finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game; Cheap talk; Teams compared to individuals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 C92 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:146:y:2018:i:c:p:55-64