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Anti-corruption policy making, discretionary power and institutional quality: An experimental analysis

Amadou Boly and Robert Gillanders ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, vol. 152, issue C, 314-327

Abstract: We analyse policymakers’ incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that ‘public officials’, even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own actions (legal equality), compared to a setting where it does not (legal inequality). More surprising perhaps is the finding that policy-makers do not choose a zero level of detection on average, even when it applies to them too. Finally, corruption is significantly lower when the detection probability is exogenously set, suggesting that the institutional power to choose detection can itself be corruptive.

Keywords: Anti-corruption; Embezzlement; Experimental economics; Institutions; Policy-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D02 D73 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Anti-corruption policy-making, discretionary power, and institutional quality An experimental analysis (2016) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:152:y:2018:i:c:p:314-327

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