Anti-corruption policy-making, discretionary power, and institutional quality: An experimental analysis

Amadou Boly and Robert Gillanders

No wp-2016-88, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: We analyse policy makers' incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that 'public officials', even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own actions (legal equality), compared to a setting where it does not (legal inequality). As 'public officials' are on average equally corrupt with or without legal equality, an institutional setting with legal equality can be considered worse in reducing corruption.

Keywords: Government accountability; Corruption; Public policy (Law) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Anti-corruption policy making, discretionary power and institutional quality: An experimental analysis (2018)
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