Does trust in the government matter for whistleblowing on tax evaders? Survey and experimental evidence

Armenak Antinyan, Luca Corazzini and Filippo Pavesi

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, vol. 171, issue C, 77-95

Abstract: Whistleblowing is a powerful tool that the tax authorities of various countries use to curb tax evasion. Nonetheless, the determinants shaping one's positive attitude toward whistleblowing are rather understudied. We investigate the relationship between trust in the government and the attitude toward whistleblowing on tax evaders. Potential whistleblowers may distrust the government either because they doubt that it will operate efficiently (avoiding to waste tax revenue) and fairly (treating all taxpayers equally), or because they fear that their anonymity may not be preserved. We focus on the relationship between the former channel of distrust and the attitude toward whistleblowing, and our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we provide motivating evidence from a unique national household survey administered in the Republic of Armenia. We then present results from a large-scale survey experiment in the USA that provides causal evidence in support of the investigated relationship. Our main finding is that a more trustworthy government exerts a positive effect on citizens’ attitude toward whistleblowing.

Keywords: Government trust; Whistleblowing; Tax evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G28 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:171:y:2020:i:c:p:77-95

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.014

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