College matching mechanisms and matching stability: Evidence from a natural experiment in China
Le Kang and
Yang Song ()
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, vol. 175, issue C, 206-226
Matching mechanisms play a crucial role in the college admissions process, which in turn influence education and labor market outcomes. We exploit geographical and temporal variation in Chinese college admissions reform to provide new empirical evidence on how matching mechanisms affect matching stability. Consistent with theoretical findings by Chen and Kesten (2017), we show that in changing from the Immediate Acceptance (IA) mechanism to the Chinese parallel mechanism, a hybrid of IA and the Deferred Acceptance mechanisms, matching stability improved, as proxied by the level of stratification precision. This effect is stronger for provinces with wider first parallel choice bands in a nonlinear way.
Keywords: College admissions; School choice; Matching mechanism; Matching stability; Immediate Acceptance mechanism; Chinese parallel mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 I23 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:175:y:2020:i:c:p:206-226
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