Dishonesty and risk-taking: Compliance decisions of individuals and groups

Martin Fochmann, Nadja Fochmann, Martin Kocher and Nadja Müller

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, vol. 185, issue C, 250-286

Abstract: Unethical behavior in organizations is usually associated with the risk of negative consequences for the organization and for the involved managers if being detected. The existing experimental literature in economics has so far focused mainly on the analysis of unethical behavior in environments that involve no fines or similar monetary consequences. In the current paper, we use a tax compliance framework to study (un-)ethical behavior of individuals and small groups. Our results show that groups are clearly less compliant than individuals. The risk of being detected is the most important aspect in the group communication process when deciding on compliance.

Keywords: Dishonesty; Lying; Compliance; Risk-taking; Group decisions; Communication; Norms; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D03 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dishonesty and Risk-Taking: Compliance Decisions of Individuals and Groups (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:185:y:2021:i:c:p:250-286

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.018

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