Game form recognition in preference elicitation, cognitive abilities, and cognitive load

Andreas Drichoutis and Rodolfo Nayga

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2022, vol. 193, issue C, 49-65

Abstract: This study further examines the failure of game form recognition in preference elicitation (Cason and Plott, 2014) by making elicitation more cognitively demanding through a cognitive load manipulation. We hypothesized that if subjects misperceive one game for another game, then by depleting their cognitive resources, subjects would misconceive the more-cognitively demanding task for the less-cognitively demanding task at a higher rate. We find no evidence that subjects suffer from a first-price-auction game-form misconception, but once cognitive resources are depleted, subjects’ choices are better explained by random choice. More cognitively able subjects are more immune to deviations from sub-optimal play than lower cognitively able subjects. Moreover, we find no support for partial game form recognition. Our results are robust to the integration of risk preferences in the analysis.

Keywords: Game form recognition; Game form misconception; Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism; First price auction; Preference elicitation; Cognitive load; Cognitive resources; Raven test; Fluid intelligence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C80 C91 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Game form recognition in preference elicitation, cognitive abilities and cognitive load (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:193:y:2022:i:c:p:49-65

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.11.006

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