To deceive or not to deceive: The effect of deception on behavior in future laboratory experiments

Julian Jamison, Dean Karlan and Laura Schechter

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, vol. 68, issue 3-4, 477-488

Abstract: Experimental economists believe (and enforce the idea) that researchers should not employ deception in the design of experiments. This rule exists in order to protect a public good: the ability of other researchers to conduct experiments and to have participants trust their instructions to be an accurate representation of the game being played. Yet other social sciences, particularly psychology, do not maintain such a rule. We examine whether such a public goods problem exists by purposefully deceiving some participants in one study, informing them of this fact, and then examining whether the deceived participants behave differently in a subsequent study. We find significant differences in the selection of individuals who return to play after being deceived as well as (to a lesser extent) the behavior in the subsequent games, thus providing qualified support for the proscription of deception. We discuss policy implications for the maintenance of separate participant pools.

Keywords: Laboratory; experimental; methods; Experimental; economics; Deception; Psychology; and; economics; Laboratory; selection; effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Working Paper: To Deceive or Not to Deceive: The Effect of Deception on Behavior inFuture Laboratory Experiments (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:68:y:2008:i:3-4:p:477-488

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