Higher cognitive ability is associated with lower entries in a p-beauty contest

Terence Burnham, David Cesarini, Magnus Johannesson, Paul Lichtenstein and Björn Wallace

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2009, vol. 72, issue 1, 171-175

Abstract: "Beauty contests" are well-studied, dominance-solvable games that generate two interesting results. First, most behavior does not conform to the unique Nash equilibrium. Second, there is considerable unexplained heterogeneity in behavior. In this work, we explore the relationship between beauty contest behavior and cognitive ability. We find that subjects with high cognitive ability exhibit behavior that is closer to the Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Cognitive; ability; Experimental; economics; Beauty; contests; Rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (98)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:72:y:2009:i:1:p:171-175

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