Credible communication and cooperation: Experimental evidence from multi-stage Games

Ola Andersson and Erik Wengström

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012, vol. 81, issue 1, 207-219

Abstract: It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Sending or receiving pre-play messages has a positive and significant effect on cooperation if there is no possibility of intra-play communication. However, this effect is significantly reduced when when intra-play communication is allowed. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities.

Keywords: Communication; Cooperation; Renegotiation; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Working Paper: Credible Communication and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:1:p:207-219

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.002

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