Temporal stability and psychological foundations of cooperation preferences

Stefan Volk, Christian Thöni and Winfried Ruigrok

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012, vol. 81, issue 2, 664-676

Abstract: A core element of economic theory is the assumption of stable preferences. We test this assumption in public goods games by repeatedly eliciting cooperation preferences in a fixed subject pool over a period of five months. We find that cooperation preferences are very stable at the aggregate level, and, to a smaller degree, at the individual level, allowing us to predict future behavior fairly accurately. Furthermore, our results provide evidence on the psychological foundations of cooperation preferences. The personality dimension ‘Agreeableness’ is closely related to both the type and the stability of cooperation preferences.

Keywords: Social preferences; Preference stability; Conditional cooperation; Free riding; Personality; Big-Five (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (109)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:2:p:664-676

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.006

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