Gender differences in ultimatum games: Despite rather than due to risk attitudes
Aurora García-Gallego (),
Nikolaos Georgantzís () and
Ainhoa Jaramillo-Gutiérrez ()
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012, vol. 83, issue 1, 42-49
We analyze experimental data obtained from an ultimatum game framed as a situation of employee–employer negotiation over salaries. Parallel to this, we elicit subjects’ risk attitudes. In the existing literature, it has often been conjectured that gender differences in strategic environments are partly due to differences in risky decision making. Our evidence suggests that both gender and risk-related effects co-exist in ultimatum bargaining. However, differences in risk attitudes cannot explain gender effects in ultimatum bargaining.
Keywords: Gender differences; Ultimatum game; Risk attitudes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D03 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:83:y:2012:i:1:p:42-49
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