Intention-based reciprocity and the hidden costs of control

Ferdinand von Siemens

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, vol. 92, issue C, 55-65

Abstract: Empirical research suggests that – despite strengthening conventional incentives to put in effort – exerting control might reduce worker performance. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can explain such hidden costs of control if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not being controlled might then be considered to be kind, because not everybody reciprocates not being controlled with high effort. This argument contrasts existing theoretical wisdom on the hidden costs of control that is almost exclusively based on signaling.

Keywords: Intention-based reciprocity; Incomplete information; Hidden costs of control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C70 D63 D82 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268113001248
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:92:y:2013:i:c:p:55-65

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.017

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().