Measuring lying aversion

Uri Gneezy, Bettina Rockenbach and Marta Serra-Garcia

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, vol. 93, issue C, 293-300

Abstract: We introduce a new method for measuring the decision to lie in experiments. In the game, the decision to lie increases own payment independent of the counterpart's decision, but potentially at a cost for the counterpart. We identify at the individual level the decision to lie, and measure how individuals react to different incentives to lie. Furthermore we investigate how lying behavior changes over time. Our method allows us to classify people into types, including those who never lie, those who always lie, and those who react to incentives to lie. We suggest this method as a useful instrument for examining factors that influence the decision to lie.

Keywords: Deception; Lying; Lying aversion; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D03 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (206)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726811300070X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:93:y:2013:i:c:p:293-300

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.025

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().