A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

Takashi Kunimoto and Roberto Serrano

Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 6, 2583-2595

Abstract: We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions of available sufficiency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some mechanisms that do not satisfy the best element property must be employed. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation by mechanisms satisfying the best element property are more restrictive than previously thought.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Exact and approximate implementation; Iteratively undominated strategies; Restricted deception-proofness; Incentive compatibility; Measurability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies (2010)
Working Paper: A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:6:p:2583-2595

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.02.005

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