A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies

Takashi Kunimoto and Roberto Serrano

No 2010-2, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Implementation in iteratively undominated strategies relies on permissive conditions. However, for the sufficiency results available, authors have relied on assumptions that amount to quasilinear preferences on a numeraire. We uncover a new necessary condition that implies that such assumptions cannot be dispensed with. We term the condition ìrestricted deceptionproofness.î It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation are more restrictive than previously thought.

Keywords: mechanism design; exact and approximate implementation; iteratively undominated strategies; restricted deception-proofness; incentive compatibility; measurability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies (2011)
Working Paper: A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bro:econwp:2010-2

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