A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

Takashi Kunimoto and Roberto Serrano

No 2010-03, Working Papers from Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales

Abstract: Implementation in iteratively undominated strategies relies on permissive conditions. However, for the sufficiency results available, authors have relied on assumptions that amount to quasilinear preferences on a numeraire. We uncover a new necessary condition that implies that such assumptions cannot be dispensed with. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation are more restrictive than previously thought.

Keywords: mechanism design; exact and approximate implementation; iteratively undominated strategies; restricted deception-proofness; incentive compatibility; measurability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory 146 (6), November 2011: 2583–2595

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Related works:
Journal Article: A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies (2011)
Working Paper: A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies (2010)
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