Job market signaling and employer learning

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Julien Prat

Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 147, issue 5, 1787-1817

Abstract: We consider a signaling model where the senderʼs continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous-time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixed-strategy equilibria involving multiple pooling are possible. Second, pooling equilibria can survive the Intuitive Criterion when learning is efficient enough.

Keywords: Employer learning; Signaling games; Intuitive Criterion; Multiple pooling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning (2008)
Working Paper: Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:5:p:1787-1817

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018

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