Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning

Julien Prat and Carlos Alós-Ferrer

No 648, 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: to inefficient separations so that signaling yields employment and welfare gains.

Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2007/paper_648.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Job market signaling and employer learning (2012)
Working Paper: Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed007:648

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().