Dynamic sender–receiver games
Jérôme Renault,
Eilon Solan () and
Nicolas Vieille ()
Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 2, 502-534
Abstract:
We consider a dynamic version of sender–receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.
Keywords: Sender–receiver; Dynamic games; Bayesian games; Communication; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic sender-receiver games (2013)
Working Paper: Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games (2012) 
Working Paper: Dynamic sender receiver games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:502-534
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.006
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