Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games

Jérôme Renault, Eilon Solan () and Nicolas Vieille ()

No 966, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.

Keywords: sender-receiver; dynamic games; bayesian games; communication; repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2012-09-15
Note: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2229960
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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic sender–receiver games (2013)
Working Paper: Dynamic sender-receiver games (2013)
Working Paper: Dynamic sender receiver games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:0966

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