Dynamic sender-receiver games

Nicolas Vieille (), Eilon Solan () and Jérôme Renault

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Abstract: We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.

Keywords: sender-receiver; dynamic games; bayesian games; communication; repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148 (2), pp.502-534. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.006⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic sender–receiver games (2013)
Working Paper: Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games (2012)
Working Paper: Dynamic sender receiver games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00804028

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.006

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