Two-player rationalizable implementation

Ritesh Jain, Ville Korpela and Michele Lombardi

Journal of Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 227, issue C

Abstract: The paper characterizes the class of two-player social choice functions implementable in rationalizable strategies under complete information.

Keywords: Implementation; Two players; Rationalizability; Complete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:227:y:2025:i:c:s0022053125000778

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106031

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