Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation

R Jain, Ville Korpela and Michele Lombardi

No 202228, Working Papers from University of Liverpool, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper characterizes the class of two-player social choice functions implementable in rationalizable strategies. We offer two equivalent conditions, TwoPlayer Generalized Strict Maskin Monotonicity** and Partition Monotonicity. Similar to Bergemann et al. (2011) and Xiong (2022), Two-Player Generalized Strict Maskin Monotonicity** relies on the existence of a partition of the set of states. However, Partition Monotonicity provides a construction for the partition.

Keywords: Implementation; Two Players; Rationalizability; Complete Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
Date: 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/schoolof ... e,Implementation.pdf First version, 2022 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation (2023)
Working Paper: Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:liv:livedp:202228

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