Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation

Ritesh Jain (), Ville Korpela and Michele Lombardi
Additional contact information
Ritesh Jain: University of Liverpool Management School.

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: The paper characterizes the class of two-player social choice functions implementable in rationalizable strategies. We offer two equivalent conditions, Two-Player Generalized Strict Maskin Monotonicity** and Partition Monotonicity. Similar to Bergemann et al. (2011) and Xiong (2022), Two-Player Generalized Strict Maskin Monotonicity** relies on the existence of a partition of the set of states. However, Partition Monotonicity provides a construction for the partition.

Keywords: Implementation; Two Players; Rationalizability; Complete Information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-12-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.csef.it/WP/wp660.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation (2023)
Working Paper: Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:660

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dr. Maria Carannante ().