Efficiency and behavioral considerations in labor negotiations

Manfred Königstein and Marie Claire Villeval

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2010, vol. 31, issue 4, 599-611

Abstract: Experimental literature has shown that social preferences influence how individuals bargain and make sharing decisions. It usually considers situations in which individuals negotiate on a single issue. This paper explores a different environment and reports on an experiment based on a non-cooperative game in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous. We find that firms reveal a strong preference for single-issue bargaining although the subgame perfect equilibrium predicts the choice of the multi-issue bargaining. In multi-issue bargaining unions offer smaller relative payoff shares to firms than in single-issue bargaining and this leads to a higher conflict rate than in a single-issue bargaining. Social preferences and a concern for relative payoffs support this preference for a restricted bargaining agenda but they induce a loss of efficiency.

Keywords: Bargaining; agenda; Efficient; contracts; Right-to-manage; Social; preferences; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:599-611

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