Efficiency and behavioral considerations in labor negotiations
Manfred Königstein and
Marie Claire Villeval ()
Additional contact information
Manfred Königstein: IZA - Institute for the study of labor - Institute for the Study of Labor - IZA, Universität Erfurt - Universität Erfurt
Post-Print from HAL
Experimental literature has shown that social preferences influence how individuals bargain and make sharing decisions. It usually considers situations in which individuals negotiate on a single issue. This paper explores a different environment and reports on an experiment based on a non-cooperative game in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous. We fnd that firms reveal a strong preference for single-issue bargaining although the subgame perfect equilibrium predicts the choice of the multi-issue bargaining. In multi-issue bargaining unions offer smaller relative payoff shares to firms than in single-issue bargaining and this leads to a higher conflict rate than in a single-issue bargaining. Social preferences and a concern for relative payoffs support this preference for a restricted bargaining agenda but they induce a loss of efficiency.
Keywords: Experiment; Bargaining agenda; Efficient contracts; Right-to-manage; Social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00550466
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, 2010, 31 (4), pp. 599-611. 〈10.1016/j.joep.2010.04.003〉
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Efficiency and behavioral considerations in labor negotiations (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00550466
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().