Walking the talk in multiparty bargaining: An experimental investigation

Kathleen L. McGinn, Katherine Milkman and Markus Nöth

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2012, vol. 33, issue 1, 278-291

Abstract: We study the framing effects of communication on payoffs in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or competition, moving parties on a path toward or away from equal-division agreements. These endogenous framing effects may outweigh any overall social utility effects due to the mere presence of communication. In two studies, we find that non-binding talk about fairness within a three-party, complete-information game leads toward off-equilibrium, equal division payoffs, while non-binding talk focusing on Competitive Reasoning moves parties away from equal divisions. Our two studies allow us to demonstrate that manipulated pre-game talk and spontaneous within-game dialogue lead to the same results.

Keywords: Communication; Fairness; Bargaining; Negotiations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D74 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:33:y:2012:i:1:p:278-291

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2011.10.008

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