Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation

Kathleen L. McGinn (), Katherine Milkman and Markus Nöth ()
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Kathleen L. McGinn: Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit
Markus Nöth: Universität Hamburg,

No 10-039, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: We study the framing effects of communication in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or competition, moving parties on a path toward or away from equal-division agreements. These endogenous framing effects may outweigh any overall social utility effects due to the mere presence of communication. In two experiments, we find that non-binding talk of fairness within a three-party, complete-information game leads toward off-equilibrium, equal division payoffs, while non-binding talk focusing on competitive reasoning moves parties away from equal divisions. Our two studies allow us to demonstrate that spontaneous within-game dialogue and manipulated pre-game talk lead to the same results.

Keywords: communication; fairness; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D03 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Walking the talk in multiparty bargaining: An experimental investigation (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hbs:wpaper:10-039

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