The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation

Roel van Veldhuizen

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2013, vol. 39, issue C, 341-356

Abstract: Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials’ wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise.

Keywords: Bribery; Corruption; Experimental economics; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:39:y:2013:i:c:p:341-356

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.009

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