The Influence of Wages on Public Officials' Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation

Roel van Veldhuizen

No 12-038/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. This paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, experienced low wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option.

Keywords: bribery; corruption; experimental economics; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04-13
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation (2013)
Working Paper: The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: A laboratory investigation (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120038

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