The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: A laboratory investigation

Roel van Veldhuizen

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise.

Keywords: Bribery; corruption; experimental economics; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-law and nep-nps
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/86142/1/770683754.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation (2013)
Working Paper: The Influence of Wages on Public Officials' Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2013210

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