Bargaining under surveillance: Evidence from a three-person ultimatum game

Lauri Sääksvuori and Abhijit Ramalingam

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2015, vol. 51, issue C, 66-78

Abstract: This paper investigates how the transparency of decision-making affects preferences over distributional outcomes. We also examine what motivates individuals to voluntarily invest economic resources to monitor decision-making processes. We find that third-party monitoring does not affect distributional outcomes in a three-person ultimatum game. Our results show that a large majority of individuals is willing to pay for a right to monitor decision-making processes despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. We observe that third-parties are over-confident in believing that an opportunity to scrutinize decision-making processes changes distributional outcomes for their own benefit. Our results suggest that people may over-estimate the effect of transparent decision-making on economic outcomes.

Keywords: Bargaining; Communication; Distributional preferences; Experiment; Negotiations; Surveillance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D01 D03 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Bargaining under surveillance: Evidence from a three-person ultimatum game (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:51:y:2015:i:c:p:66-78

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2015.08.007

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