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Bargaining under surveillance: Evidence from a three-person ultimatum game

Lauri Sääksvuori and Abhijit Ramalingam

No 15-01, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: This paper examines how third-party surveillance influences preferences over distributional outcomes. In addition, we examine what motivates people to invest economic resources to monitor decision-making processes. Our results show that a large majority of individuals is willing to pay for a right to monitor decision-making processes over distributional outcomes despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. We find that electronic third-party surveillance does not affect distributional outcomes in a three-person ultimatum game. Finally, we find that third- parties are the most over-optimistic about their own outcomes when they have a chance to signal their presence to the negotiators. Our results suggest that people may overestimate the impact of transparent decision-making on economic outcomes.

Keywords: bargaining; communication; distributional preferences; experiment; negotiations; surveillance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D01 D03 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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