Team incentives and leadership

Michalis Drouvelis, Daniele Nosenzo and Martin Sefton

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2017, vol. 62, issue C, 173-185

Abstract: We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism (team output is shared equally among team members) and a hierarchical mechanism (team output is allocated by a team leader). We find that output is higher when a leader has the power to allocate output, but this mechanism also generates large differences between earnings of leaders and other team members. When team members can choose how much of team output is to be shared equally and how much is to be allocated by a leader they tend to restrict the leader’s power to distributing less than half of the pie.

Keywords: Team production; Leadership; Reward power; Delegation; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 L22 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Team Incentives and Leadership (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:62:y:2017:i:c:p:173-185

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.07.002

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