Decisiveness, peace, and inequality in games of conflict

Juan A. Lacomba, Francisco Lagos, Ernesto Reuben and Frans van Winden

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2017, vol. 63, issue C, 216-229

Abstract: In this paper, we study two games of conflict characterized by unequal access to productive resources and finitely repeated interaction. In the Noisy Conflict game, the winner of the conflict is randomly determined depending on a players’ relative conflict expenditures. In the Decisive Conflict game, the winner of the conflict is simply the player who spends more on conflict. By comparing behavior in the two games, we evaluate the effect that “decisiveness” has on the allocation of productive resources to conflict, the resulting inequality in the players’ final wealth, and the likelihood that players form long-lasting peaceful relations.

Keywords: Conflict; Decisiveness; Inequality; Peace; Rent seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Decisiveness, Peace, and Inequality in Games of Conflict (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:63:y:2017:i:c:p:216-229

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2016.11.003

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