Decisiveness, Peace, and Inequality in Games of Conflict
Juan A. Lacomba (),
Francisco Lagos (),
Ernesto Reuben () and
Frans van Winden ()
Additional contact information
Juan A. Lacomba: Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.
No 16/04, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.
In this paper, we study two games of conflict characterized by unequal access to productive resources and finitely repeated interaction. In the Noisy Conflict game, the winner of the conflict is randomly determined depending on a players’ relative conflict expenditures. In the Decisive Conflict game, the winner of the conflict is simply the player who spends more on conflict. By comparing behavior in the two games, we evaluate the effect that “decisiveness” has on the allocation of productive resources to conflict, the resulting inequality in the players’ final wealth, and the likelihood that players from long-lasting peaceful relations..
Keywords: conflict; decisiveness; inequality; peace; rent seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Decisiveness, peace, and inequality in games of conflict (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:16/04
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. Campus Universitario de Cartuja. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Angel Solano Garcia. ().