On signaling disability in anonymous economic games

Sylvain Max, Gilles Grolleau (), Rodolphe Perchot and Angela Sutan

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2020, vol. 78, issue C

Abstract: We experimentally tested whether individuals behave differently when they interact with other individuals whose disability is salient in dictator and ultimatum games. We found that participants are more generous and fairer with disabled people, and that this behavior is not strategic. These effects are driven by the specific nature of the disability not by the difference per se. The evidence regarding the effect of acquired versus permanent disability is mixed.

Keywords: Dictator game; Ultimatum game; Disability; Fairness; Generosity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: On signaling disability in anonymous economic games (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:78:y:2020:i:c:s0167487020300295

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102272

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