Goal-oriented agents in a market

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and Nicolas Querou

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2021, vol. 84, issue C

Abstract: We consider a market where “standard”risk-neutral agents coexist with “goal-oriented”agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the “trigger”) to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goal-oriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments.

Keywords: Goal-oriented agents; Incentives; Matching market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Goal-oriented agents in a market (2021)
Working Paper: Goal-Oriented Agents in a Market (2020)
Working Paper: Goal-oriented agents in a market (2020)
Working Paper: Goal-oriented agents in a market (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:84:y:2021:i:c:s0167487021000179

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102378

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