Goal-Oriented Agents in a Market

Nicolas Quérou, David Pérez-Castrillo and Ines Macho-Stadler
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Perez-Castrillo and Nicolas Quérou

No 1190, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We consider a market where "standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goal-oriented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff¤ (the "trigger") to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and the incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with a positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary since goal- oriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives than standard agents. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments.

Keywords: incentives; matching market; goal-oriented agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Goal-oriented agents in a market (2021)
Working Paper: Goal-oriented agents in a market (2021)
Working Paper: Goal-oriented agents in a market (2020)
Working Paper: Goal-oriented agents in a market (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1190

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